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Executive Summary
This paper attempts to (i) describe the causes of the
banking crisis and procedures of crisis resolution, (ii)
summarize policy issues, and (iii) draw policy rec-
ommendations. It has four sections: (i) overview of
the Korean banking sector, (ii) recent developments
in the banking sector, (iii) policy issues, and (iv) policy
recommendations. The first section shows how the
banking sector has grown rapidly in the last 50 years
and contributed significantly to the country’s remark-
able economic growth by mobilizing financial re-
sources for business firms. However, selective credit
allocation and prolonged interest control—the primary
tools of economic development in Korea—have re-
sulted in an inefficient and distorted financial sys-
tem. Extensive Government involvement in the in-
ternal management of financial institutions has un-
dermined the autonomy and accountability of man-
agement. Lack of an effective supervisory system
resulted in excessive risk taking and moral-hazard
problems plaguing the industry. The corporate bank-
ruptcies of 1997 saddled the nation’s commercial
banks with extremely large nonperforming loans
(NPLs), which led to the banking crisis.
The second section discusses (i) restructuring of
the banking sector, (ii) resolution of NPLs and re-
capitalization of banks, (iii) reshaping of the institu-
tional framework, (iv) deposit insurance system,
(v) prudential regulation, and (vi) loan classification
standards and provisioning requirements. Two criti-
cal questions regarding restructuring are (i) how to
share the costs among the parties concerned and
(ii) how to mobilize the necessary resources. The
Government has made it clear that the cost of eco-
nomic restructuring must be met primarily by the fi-
nancial institutions so as to minimize both the burden
on taxpayers and the risk of moral hazard. The Gov-
ernment will provide supplementary fiscal support
for (i) the purchase of NPLs, (ii) recapitalization of
viable institutions, and (iii) possible deposit payoffs in
the event of closure, but only if the ailing institutions’
self-rescue plans are successfully implemented. The
necessary public funds are raised mainly by issuing
bonds of the Korea Asset Management Corporation
(KAMCO) and the Korea Deposit Insurance Cor-
poration (KDIC), whose interest payments are ab-
sorbed by the budget. Along with restructuring, swift
and prudent reform also requires an institutional
framework to coordinate and monitor the reform pro-
cess. The Financial Supervisory Commission (FSC)
and the Ministry of Finance and Economy (MOFE)
have made significant efforts to improve the institu-
tional setting of the financial system in order to pre-
vent another crisis. Crisis prevention demands a
healthy domestic financial system. Necessary pre-
conditions for such a financial system are (i) confi-
dence of depositors, (ii) sound risk management, and
(iii) prudential regulation. Since the crisis, the Gov-
ernment has established a system of prudential regu-
lation and supervision for the financial sector. The
new system includes (i) a strengthened prompt cor-
rective action (PCA) scheme, (ii) a transparent ac-
counting system with accurate and conservative port-
folio valuation and classification, (iii) new banking
sector disclosure items, (iv) enforcement of liquidity
management relative to foreign exchange risk, and
(v) transparent treatment of trust accounts.
The third section focuses on seven policy issues:
(i) prudential regulation, (ii) resolving NPLs, (iii) de-
posit insurance system, (iv) enhancing competition,
(v) improving financial governance, (vi) bank restruc-
turing, and (vii) resolving the credit crunch. The Gov-
ernment has allocated significant resources to ad-
dress each issue, especially after the crisis. How-
ever, the issues have not been resolved yet because
most of them are long-term and institutional. The
section discusses prudential regulation in detail as it
is essential for preventing crises from recurring.
The fourth section recommends policies to solve
the problems discussed in the previous section. The
most important policy is on staffing regulatory orga-
nizations. KAMCO should sell NPLs within a lim-
ited time period. Private “bad” banks (those dealing
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with bad loans) must be established in order to acti-
vate the distressed assets market. The deposit insur-
ance system must charge according to risk. To en-
hance competition, the Government should signifi-
cantly lower entry barriers. Ownership restrictions
should be removed and board governance strength-
ened. The Government should also introduce trans-
parent management of de facto State banks.
In sum, the crisis was amplified by (i) capacity-
driven policy, (ii) loose market discipline, and (iii) lack
of transparency. As a result, banks burdened with
NPLs suffer from eroded capital. The Government
established four basic principles for financial restruc-
turing and completed the first round of restructuring
at the end of September 1998. The second round of
restructuring focuses on reengineering banking pro-
cesses and empowering bankers. Banks are encour-
aged to implement best practices in the area of
(i) corporate governance, (ii) strategy, (iii) structure,
(iv) risk management, and (v) performance culture.
The first round of restructuring was relatively easy
because it was initiated by the International Monetary
Fund (IMF), and its economic rationale overrode all
political issues. However, many difficulties are ex-
pected in the second round of restructuring since IMF
no longer has the power to impose restructuring, and
it is more difficult to restructure software than hard-
ware. The process will be a long one.
Overview
The Korean financial industry consists of three
groups: (i) a central bank (BOK); (ii) deposit money
banks, including commercial and specialized banks;
and (iii) nonbank financial institutions (NBFIs), which
include development, savings, investment, insurance,
and other institutions.
The Korea Development Bank and Export-Im-
port Bank of Korea engage in similar activities. Us-
ing Government funds, foreign capital, or funds raised
from the issue of special debentures, they provide
medium- and long-term loans or credit to key sec-
tors such as (i) the export industry, (ii) parts and com-
ponents industry, (iii) high-technology business, and
(iv) research and development projects for develop-
ing new technologies.
Savings institutions consist of (i) trust accounts of
banks, (ii) mutual savings and finance companies,
(iii) credit unions, (iv) mutual credit facilities, (v) com-
munity credit cooperatives, and (vi) postal savings.
They grant small loans with funds raised through time
deposits.
Investment institutions act as financial intermedi-
aries in the money and capital markets. They include
(i) merchant banking corporations, (ii) securities in-
vestment trust companies, and (iii) the Korea Secu-
rities Finance Corporation.
Insurance institutions are composed of (i) domes-
tic life insurance companies, (ii) joint ventures with
foreign insurance companies, (iii) branches and sub-
sidiaries of foreign life insurance companies, and (iv)
Postal Life Insurance.
Other institutions are (i) securities companies; (ii)
leasing companies; and (iii) installment credit com-
panies, the last of which were launched in 1996. They
function as supplementary financial institutions, but
do not act as financial intermediaries.
Banks are either commercial or specialized. Com-
mercial banks may be (i) nationwide banks, (ii) re-
gional banks, or (iii) foreign bank branches.
As of end-1998, there were 12 nationwide com-
mercial banks with 4,199 domestic branches (Table
1).1 Among commercial banks, nationwide banks hold
the largest assets: W517 trillion or 85 percent of total
assets. The major sources of the banks’ funds are
bank deposits: (i) won deposits, (ii) certificates of
deposits (CDs), and (iii) foreign currency deposits.
There are eight regional banks with total assets of
W48 trillion (Table 1).2  They are authorized to oper-
ate principally within their own province, but individual
banks may open up to 10 branches in Seoul and 2
branches in each of the six major regional cities. The
financial structure of a regional bank is similar to that
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of a nationwide commercial bank, except that the pro-
portion of deposits in foreign currencies is smaller.
Fifty-one foreign banks were operating in the coun-
try as of end-1998. Foreign banks have been more
successful in wholesale than retail banking due to
their comparative advantage. They hold equities equal
to about 15 percent of their total assets or about
W41.3 trillion.
There are four specialized banks: (i) Industrial
Bank of Korea, which finances small and medium-
sized enterprises; (ii) the credit and banking sector
of the National Agricultural Cooperative Federation;
(iii) the National Federation of Fisheries Coopera-
tives’; and (iv) the National Livestock Cooperatives
Federation’s bank. The Government uses them mainly
as a direct conduit to control the flow of funds to
various economic sectors to carry out its industrial
policy. However, the banks also engage in commer-
cial banking activities, which have considerably in-
creased.
The banking sector has grown rapidly in the last
50 years and contributed significantly to the country’s
remarkable economic growth by mobilizing financial
resources for business firms in the 1960s and 1970s,
when it dominated the financial market. In the early
1970s, however, the Government established vari-
ous NBFIs and developed the securities market to
diversify the sources of investment funds and to in-
duce the unorganized curb market to enter the orga-
nized financial market. NBFIs have grown rapidly
owing to their higher interest rates and greater de-
gree of managerial autonomy. As a result, the bank-
Table 1:  Capital and Assets of Deposit Money Banks, as of end-1998 (W billion)
(  ) = negative values are enclosed in parentheses.
a Hana Bank and Boram Bank were merged in January 1999.
Source: Financial Supervisory Service, 1999.
Bank
Nationwide Banks
Chohung
Hanvit
Korea First
Seoul
Korea Exchange
Kookmin
Korea Housing
Shinhan
KorAm
Hanaa
Borama
Peace
Subtotal
Regional Banks
Daegu
Pusan
Kwangju
Cheju
Jeonbuk
Kangwon
Kyongnam
Chungbuk
Subtotal
Total
Paid-in Capital
9,304
34,450
16,000
16,000
11,750
13,815
7,427
11,690
7,483
3,496
1,756
2,200
135,371
5,021
3,252
2,800
550
1,153
250
2,470
250
15,746
151,117
Equity Capital
1,351
38,449
485
2,655
16,636
31,800
13,986
24,135
9,752
8,633
721
(883)
147,720
5,055
2,649
1,919
528
1,243
(1,905)
3,053
(698)
11,844
159,564
Deposits (including
trust accounts)
32,568
61,261
25,085
19,806
34,177
56,397
39,339
29,178
17,556
21,064
12,256
6,180
354,867
9,404
8,372
5,157
1,161
2,423
2,249
5,022
1,795
35,583
390,450
Total Assets
45,594
88,780
34,949
29,977
52,200
87,430
55,099
44,515
26,466
27,825
15,846
8,426
517,106
12,799
10,999
7,027
1,465
3,212
3,078
7,139
2,255
47,974
565,080
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ing sector’s share of deposits decreased from 51
percent in 1975 to about 20 percent in 1997, while
that of nonbanks increased sharply (Table 2).
The banking sector suffered due to inefficient
internal management and was exposed to moral haz-
ard. The Government-led growth strategy since the
early 1960s has involved routine Government inter-
vention in the financial sector, preventing the de-
velopment of market discipline. Selective credit al-
location and prolonged interest control—the primary
tools of the country’s economic development—re-
sulted in an inefficient and distorted financial sys-
tem. Segmentation within the financial industry as
well as high entry barriers have limited financial
institutions’ initiative and innovation. Extensive Gov-
ernment involvement in the internal management
of financial institutions has undermined their au-
tonomy and accountability. Its ineffective supervi-
sory system allowed excessive risk taking by fi-
nancial institutions.
The Government has intermittently attempted to
overhaul the outmoded financial system into one that
is market-oriented.3  However, its reform efforts of-
ten faced political barriers, and their scope was too
limited to eradicate the distortions deeply rooted in
the financial sector.
In particular, moral hazard of the implicit Gov-
ernment guarantee was so severe as to be an im-
portant source of the financial crisis. Commercial
and merchant banks have long operated under the
guarantee, although it is not legally codified. Few
believed that the Government would allow the
banks to fail. The guarantee encouraged domestic
financial institutions to borrow more funds abroad
and invest in riskier projects than they otherwise
would, confident that the Government would bail
them out if they incurred serious losses. The fi-
nancial system’s infrastructure was inadequate by
international standards of transparency of public
and private financial institutions, bank capital re-
quirements, banking supervision, and bankruptcy
procedures.
In the absence of proper prudential supervision,
the guarantee created moral hazard, reducing the
incentive to assess potential projects for risk. The
economy as a whole ended up investing too much
and taking on excessive risk.
Even before the onset of the currency crisis, the
financial system was already in dire straits because
of excessive lending to large conglomerates, many
of which were already bankrupt.4  Financial institu-
tions’ nonperforming loans (NPLs) amounted to
W28.5 trillion as of September 1997, or 6.3 percent
of all outstanding loans. Merchant banks held an ad-
ditional W3.9 trillion of bad loans as of October 1997,
or 2.9 percent of all outstanding loans.
Table 2:  Deposits of Various Financial Sectors
a Based on the total market value of stocks and b onds.
b Include trust accounts of banks, insurance companies, mutual savings and finance companies, credit unions, securities investment trust companies, etc.
Source : Ministry of Finance and Economy, Financial Statistics Bulletin, various issues.
Year
1975
1980
1985
1990
1992
1995
1997
1998
Banks
1,944
8,577
21,327
59,237
82,677
144,494
192,172
233,253
Nonbanksb
912
7,062
31,494
136,498
212,332
433,505
595,338
661,227
Equity
916
2,527
6,570
79,020
84,712
141,151
70,989
137,799
Bond
52
1,649
7,263
22,068
32,697
56,456
86,024
119,435
Total
3,824
19,815
66,654
296,823
412,418
775,606
944,523
1,151,714
Banks
50.8
43.3
32.0
20.0
20.1
18.6
20.4
20.3
Nonbanksb
23.9
35.6
47.3
46.0
51.5
55.9
63.0
57.4
Equity
24.0
12.8
9.9
26.6
20.5
18.2
7.5
12.0
Bond
1.4
8.3
10.9
7.4
7.9
7.3
9.1
10.4
Capital Marketa
Amount (W billion)
Capital Marketa
Percent Share
Total
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
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The bankruptcies saddled commercial banks with
extremely large NPLs: 14.9 percent of total loans by
December 1997, compared with 3.9 percent in De-
cember 1996. By end-1997, commercial banks held
82.5 percent of all NPLs among banks, and 78 per-
cent among financial institutions, making them highly
vulnerable to the financial crisis. Moreover, only 12
of 26 commercial banks had satisfied the required 8
percent capital adequacy ratio (CAR).
Moral hazard affected foreign financial institutions’
lending to Korean banks and other financial institu-
tions. Since foreign banks were aware of the Gov-
ernment guarantee, they did not see the need to con-
duct careful credit analyses of Korean financial in-
stitutions and firms to which they were lending vast
sums of money. When the crisis began, however,
foreign banks and investors abruptly withdrew their
investments, making no serious effort to reschedule
their loans to troubled Korean banks.
Recently, the banking industry has been changing
substantially under the comprehensive financial re-
form program agreed upon by the Government and
the International Monetary Fund (IMF). For example,
the five commercial banks which the Financial and
Supervisory Commission (FSC) evaluated on 29 June
1998 as unviable were ordered to be liquidated and
to have their good assets and liabilities transferred to
stronger banks under a purchase and assumption
(P&A) arrangement. Commercial Bank and Hanil
Bank, which were conditionally approved for restruc-
turing by FSC were merged. Korea First Bank and
Seoul Bank, which proved insolvent in 1997 and were
thereafter recapitalized by the Government, are to
be sold to foreign banks.
In the early 1990s, the Government abolished most
regulations related to the internal management of
banks. Only a few remain, including the following:
• Commercial banks are prohibited to issue finan-
cial debentures in excess of their capital.
• They are not allowed to invest in real estate nec-
essary for the conduct of their business in ex-
cess of 40 percent of their equity capital.
• They are not permitted to grant loans in excess
of their deposits.
• They are required to have liquid assets in ex-
cess of 30 percent of liquid liabilities.
• Total amount of loans granted to a single indi-
vidual or a single business group is limited to 45
percent of a bank’s equity capital.
• Total amount of investment in securities may not
exceed the size of a bank’s equity capital.
• Regional commercial banks are required to lend
to small and medium-size enterprises at least 60
percent of the increments of their loans; nation-
wide commercial banks must lend 45 percent.
Most regulations concerning foreign banks were
abolished in the early 1990s. Regulations relating
to domestic banks are now applied to foreign
banks.
Korean banks’ low profitability makes it difficult
for them to recover on their own. Plans to enhance
profit must be directed toward the following bench-
marks: (i) return on asset—1 percent, (ii) return on
equity—15 percent, and (iii) efficiency ratio—un-
der 60 percent.5  At the same time, the central bank
needs to maintain a sufficiently large difference
between the long-term and short-term interest rates
so that banks can keep a sustainable net interest
margin.
In order for banks to become competitive, their
managers must keep the interests of shareholders in
mind and maximize the banks’ value. Corporate gov-
ernance should be strengthened to allow managers
to minimize agency problems. Only profitable banks
can be competitive, and only productive banks can
be profitable. Banks have slashed the number of their
branches and employees. They will be profitable if
they succeed in managing their bad assets.
Recent Developments
Restructuring of the Banking Sector
On 14 April 1998, the Government announced the
basic framework of financial sector restructuring.6
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Prior to this, it was occupied with currency crisis
management and resorted to quick-fix and partial
measures to cure ailing institutions such as the mer-
chant banks, Korea First Bank, and Seoul Bank. It
was too busy to design a consistent and extensive
restructuring program.
The basic functions of financial restructuring can
be summarized as follows:
• Stabilize financial markets through swift and ex-
tensive reform.
• Provide timely and sufficient fiscal support.
• Set transparent principles for accountability
among parties concerned.
• Conform with internationally accepted standards.
The first and second components aim at normal-
izing the financial system as soon as possible through
swift and far-reaching reform with extensive fiscal
support. They are based on other countries’ experi-
ences that delayed action increases the cost of re-
structuring and decreases the probability of success.
Specifically, nonviable financial institutions must be
distinguished from viable ones. Once this is done,
the Government can act swiftly to bolster viable in-
stitutions through equity participation and the pur-
chase of NPLs. To qualify for this assistance, banks
are required to downsize their branch network and
lay off employees; fiscal support will be linked to
their efforts to minimize the taxpayers’ burden and
eliminate moral hazard. Institutions judged as “non-
viable” will be closed in order to stabilize the finan-
cial market and protect depositors and creditors from
defaults. The third element stresses the need for clear
burden-sharing rules in dealing with insolvent institu-
tions. The fourth ensures that structural reforms will
be made in accordance with market principles and
international standards and practices.
Financial sector restructuring will be pursued in
two phases:
• The banking sector will be normalized before
NBFIs.
• Reform of NBFIs will proceed depending on the
financial market situation.
FSC announced the first financial sector restruc-
turing schedule on 14 April and the revised one on
19 June 1998. The first round of restructuring of com-
mercial banks was completed by end-September
1998.
Most financial institutions were reviewed accord-
ing to schedule and subjected to corrective action.
Table 3 presents a summary of financial restructur-
ing as of end-August 1999.
Even though all the institutions went through the
same appraisal process, conditionally approved banks
were treated differently from nonbanks. Fiscal sup-
port for banks was provided only when rehabilitation
plans were approved by FSC and implemented. Vol-
untary mergers of banks and entry of foreign invest-
ment were encouraged through support measures
Table 3: Summary of Financial Restructuring, as of end-August 1999
Source: Ministry of Finance and Economy.
Financial Institution
Banks
Merchant Banks
Securities Companies
Insurance Companies
Investment Trust Companies
Mutual Savings and Finance Companies
Credit Unions
Leasing Companies
Total
Number
(as of end-1997)
33
30
36
50
31
231
1,666
25
2,102
Merged
4
2
0
1
0
5
44
0
56
Suspended
0
0
0
0
0
11
30
0
41
Liquidated
0
0
1
0
5
7
131
5
149
Total
9
19
6
5
7
48
206
5
305
License
Revoked
5
17
5
4
2
25
1
0
59
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such as Korea Asset Management Corporation’s
(KAMCO’s) purchase of NPLs or recapitalization
by Korea Deposit Insurance Corporation (KDIC) in
order to reverse the deterioration of the Bank for
International Settlements (BIS) CAR upon acquisi-
tion of a troubled bank.
The general restructuring strategy was strictly
applied to 26 commercial banks (16 nationwide banks
and 10 regional banks). The restructuring process
proceeded as follows:
• The Government recapitalized Korea First Bank
and Seoul Bank, which proved insolvent in 1997
before the restructuring blueprint was ready in
April 1998. On 30 January 1998, the Govern-
ment and KDIC invested W1.5 trillion in each
bank, after reducing their paid-in capital from
W820 billion to W100 billion each. In December
1998 and February 1999, the Government signed
a memorandum of understanding with Newbridge
Capital and Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank for
the sale of Korea First Bank and Seoul Bank,
respectively.
• FSC examined the capital adequacy of the other
banks in December 1997. Twelve banks fell short
of the BIS CAR of 8 percent and were required
to submit self-rehabilitation plans by 30 April
1998. The other 12 banks satisfied the BIS CAR
upon completion of due-diligence reviews by the
end of August. Troubled banks are subject to
forceful corrective action.
• Accounting firms conducted due-diligence re-
views of the banks from 1 May to 8 June 1998 in
accord-ance with the internationally accepted cri-
teria agreed upon with the World Bank.7 The
review results were much worse than expected
(Table 4). A comparison of the banks’ reported
NPL ratios as of December 1997 with the ratios
from the due-diligence review, using the num-
bers as of March 1998, indicates how distorted
the officially an-nounced bank data are, even
after considering that a stricter standard in evalu-
ating loans and other assets was applied and a
three-month difference between the measure-
ments existed.
Table 4:  Results of Due Diligence Reviews on 12 Undercapitalized Banks
( ) = negative values are enclosed in parentheses.
BIS = Bank for International Settlements, NPL = nonperforming loan.
a Assessment is based on new criteria applied to numbers as of March 1998, while the numbers as of December 1997 are based on the old Office of Bank Supervision (OBS) criteria.
b NPL: Precautionary and lower.
c Ratings assigned by FSC (C: conditionally approved; D: disapproved).
d Despite having the second highest NPL ratio, Kangwon Bank got a conditional approval when its merger with Hyundai Merchant Bank was announced. Both are affiliated
companies of the Hyundai Group.
Sources: FSC Press release, 1 July 1998; bank statistics.
Chohung
Commercial
Hanil
Korea Exchange
Chung Chong
Kyungki
Dongwha
Dongnam
Daedong
Peace
Kangwon
Chungbuk
Total
NPLb
(W billion)
2,623
1,451
1,324
2,518
425
590
602
293
487
228
443
249
11,233
Asset
(W billion)
55,600
48,552
53,853
62,319
4,829
8,894
12,968
10,055
7,715
8,359
3,869
3,139
280,152
NPL
Ratio
(%)
7.0
4.8
3.6
5.7
12.5
9.7
7.9
5.7
9.6
4.5
18.3
11.3
Adjusted
Asset
(W billion)
44,280
38,004
43,508
47,174
3,770
7,239
9,556
7,115
5,563
6,517
2,969
2,487
218,182
BIS
Ratio
(%)
1.5
1.8
4.5
2.1
(6.0)
(9.6)
(3.7)
(5.8)
(6.8)
(1.6)
(16.0)
(5.5)
NPLb
(W billion)
6,926
7,249
6,772
10,792
1,619
2,862
2,254
1,118
1,735
602
1,034
801
43,764
NPL
Ratio
(%)
19.2
24.3
20.2
28.6
36.3
49.0
28.5
20.9
34.1
12.9
45.8
28.5
Ratingc
C
C
C
C
D
D
D
D
D
C
Cd
C
Bank Reports
(as of December 1997)
Assessment Resultsa
(as of March 1998)
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• The 12-member Bank Appraisal Committee
evaluated the rehabilitation plans from 20 to 27
June 1998, and submitted its suggestion to FSC
on 28 June.8  The items reviewed were (i) capi-
tal adequacy, (ii) recapitalization plan, (iii) asset
quality classification, (iv) reduction plan for risky
assets, (v) cost reduction scheme, and (vi) man-
agement improvement plan, among others.
• With input from the Bank Appraisal Committee,
on 29 June 1998, FSC evaluated the prospects
for viability and arrived at either an “approval,”
“conditional approval,” or “disapproval” classifi-
cation for each bank.9  None of the banks re-
ceived “approval.” FSC’s final decisions were
(a) “conditional approval” for seven banks and
(b) “disapproval” of five banks.
• The seven conditionally approved banks were
ordered to submit by end-July revised implemen-
tation plans containing management reforms and
recapitalization plans, including foreign fund in-
ducement and bank merger. The plans are re-
viewed quarterly. If the implementation plans are
disapproved, a mandatory merger or transfer of
business order is to be imposed. Commercial Bank
and Hanil Bank have decided to merge. The other
banks are undergoing self-rehabilitation.
• The five disapproved banks were liquidated and
their good assets and liabilities were transferred
to relatively stronger banks under a P&A ar-
rangement.10  The P&A order was a historical
event as no Korean bank had ever been closed
before, and it gave a clear signal that financial
institutions would no longer enjoy unconditional
protection.
• However, a few conditionally approved banks
were too big to be allowed to fail. Thus, the Ko-
rea First Bank and the Seoul Bank were permit-
ted to continue their operations. The five closed
banks’ assets constituted only 7.3 percent of the
12 undercapitalized banks’ total assets.
Four bank mergers were completed as of end-
1999, encouraged by FSC’s promise to purchase
NPLs or to support recapitalization: (i) Hanvit Bank
(Commercial Bank of Korea and Hanil Bank
merger); (ii) Hana Bank (Hana Bank and Boram
Bank merger); (iii) Kookmin Bank (Kookmin Bank
and Korea Long-term Credit Bank merger); and (iv)
Chohung Bank (Chohung Bank, Chungbuk Bank,
Kangwon Bank, and Hyundai Merchant Bank
merger).
Resolution of Nonperforming Loans
and Recapitalization of Banks
There are two critical questions regarding economic
restructuring: (i) how to share the costs among the
parties concerned and (ii) how to mobilize the nec-
essary resources. The Government made it clear that
the cost of economic restructuring must be met
primarily by the financial institutions to minimize both
the burden on taxpayers and the risk of moral haz-
ard. Its fiscal support will be provided only to (i)
supplement the institutions’ own restructuring and
financing plans and (ii) purchase NPLs, recapitalize
viable institutions, and pay off deposits, but only if the
self-rescue plans of ailing institutions are successfully
implemented. The needed resources are raised mainly
by selling KAMCO and KDIC bonds, whose interest
payments are absorbed by the budget.
NONPERFORMING LOAN ESTIMATES
The main task of financial sector restructuring is the
disposal of NPLs. As of the end of March 1998,
total NPLs of all financial institutions amounted to
W112 trillion, consisting of W87 trillion for banks and
W25 trillion for nonbanks, which are the basis for
the financial restructuring plan. These include “pre-
cautionary” loans of W55 trillion (Table 5).
The Government targeted W100 trillion worth of
NPLs for immediate disposal as of March 1998,
including the core NPLs, bad loans, and a portion
of the precautionary loans that had turned bad. The
estimated total market value of NPLs was only 50
percent of their book value. Therefore, the realized
loss borne by financial institutions will be approxi-
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mately W50 trillion, which will eventually result in
the erosion of their capital base. The rest of the
NPLs will be resolved through Government fiscal
support.
The targeted W100 trillion worth of NPLs are to
be disposed of in two ways:
• Financial institutions will dispose of half by ei-
ther selling off collateral or calling in loans.
• KAMCO will purchase the remaining half at an
estimated market price of 50 percent of book
value. In accordance with the IMF agreement,
KAMCO is to dispose only of NPLs of financial
institutions whose rehabilitation plans are ap-
proved by FSC.
As of December 1998, total NPLs amounted to
W131 trillion, with bad loans at W60 trillion and pre-
cautionary loans at W71 trillion. The Government
asserted that the new levels were within a reason-
able range and that it was not necessary to change
the restructuring plan. Nonetheless, due to the tight-
ened loan classification standards effective 1 July
1998, a substantial portion of precautionary loans was
downgraded to the “substandard” category, thereby
increasing bad loans to W65.4 trillion at the end of
March 1999. Furthermore, the quality of some of the
precautionary loans may deteriorate over the course
of the ongoing corporate restructuring process. On
the other hand, the corporate workouts may signifi-
cantly reduce the amount of precautionary loans.
Moreover, FSC’s strict supervision will diminish the
likelihood that new NPLs will develop.
FISCAL SUPPORT FOR FINANCIAL
RESTRUCTURING
The first round of financial sector restructuring, which
ended on 30 September 1998, aimed at revitalizing
the troubled banks. As noted before, the Govern-
ment’s basic principles for fiscal support are the fol-
lowing:
• It will not support financial institutions unless
they exert appropriate self-rehabilitation efforts
and practice fair loss sharing among concerned
parties.11
• Fiscal support should be sufficient to make
troubled financial institutions solvent.
On 20 May 1998, the Government announced it
would spend W64 trillion until June 1999 to facilitate
financial restructuring. This amount is approximately
15.2 percent of the 1997 GDP of W421 trillion,12
which is burdensome compared to that of other coun-
tries that have experienced a similar financial cri-
sis.13  Of the W64 trillion, W32.5 trillion are for the
purchase of NPLs while W31.5 trillion are for re-
capitalization and deposit payment of ailing institu-
tions. By end-1998, W40.9 trillion were injected into
the banking sector, of which W19.4 trillion were spent
in the last three days of September alone, presum-
ably to meet the deadline for completing the first
round of bank restructuring.
As shown in Table 6, W44 trillion worth of bad
loans were purchased from banks, merchant banks,
and surety insurance companies with the W19.9 tril-
lion KAMCO bonds by end-1998, amounting to 45
Table 5: NPLs of Financial Institutions (W trillion)
FIs = financial institutions, NPL = nonperforming loan.
aSum of estimated loss, doubtful and substandard loans.
bCollateralized loans with three to six months’ interest payments in arrears. The loan classification standards were changed on 1 July 1998: (i) substandard or lower—interest
payments in arrears from six to over three months and (ii) precautionary—from three to six months to one to three months interest in arrears.
cThese numbers do not include NPLs purchased by KAMCO.
Source: Financial Supervisory Service.
March 1998 June 1998 September 1998 December 1998
Loan Classification Banks All FIs Banks All FIs Banks All FIs Banks All FIs
Bad loansa 38.9 56.5 40.0 63.5 35.0 64.0 33.6 60.2
Precautionary loansb 48.3 55.5 60.9 72.5 63.6 71.2 63.4 70.9
Total NPLsc 87.2 112.0 100.9 136.0 98.6 135.2 97.0 131.1
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to the ailing institutions rather than sold on the mar-
ket in order to minimize a possible crowding-out ef-
fect. Considering that banks have enough liquidity
after the financial crisis and that BIS risk weight of
public bonds is nil, not many bondholders are expected
to cash in. The Government guarantees the bond is-
sues and will bear interest costs, which were esti-
mated to be W3.6 trillion for 1998, and W8 trillion to
W9 trillion for 1999, but are expected to decrease
greatly with a sharp drop in interest rates.
Most of the fiscal support is expected to be re-
couped through (i) sale of collateralized assets, (ii)
divestment of acquired equity shares of financial in-
stitutions, and (iii) liquidation of insolvent financial
institutions. Thus the burden on taxpayers will be lim-
ited to the interest costs related to public bond is-
sues, which will correspondingly decline over time.
In addition, asset-backed securities will be issued
against collateral to give KAMCO flexibility in its
financing of the disposal of NPLs.14
Institutions eligible for NPL purchase are those
planning a merger or whose rehabilitation plans have
been approved by FSC. These included (i) five re-
solved and five acquiring banks, (ii) four merged
banks, (iii) nine banks under a self-rehabilitation plan,
and (iv) two merged surety insurance companies.
Eligible bad loans are those classified as “substan-
dard,” with interest payments of more than three
months in arrears.
percent of the book value. About W25 trillion to W30
trillion worth of NPLs will be purchased from spe-
cialized banks, financially sound banks, merchant
banks, securities companies, and mutual savings and
finance companies for W12.6 trillion in 1999. Addi-
tional NPLs in the future will also be purchased by
KAMCO.
Banks that acquired ailing banks or merged with
other banks received support for recapitalization and
loss compensation. KAMCO purchased the NPLs
of five acquired and acquiring banks, and injected
capital into them to prevent the deterioration of the
acquiring banks’ BIS CAR. New banks created by
the merger of a sound bank and troubled bank were
given enough fresh capital to bring their BIS CAR
up to standards of sound banks. New banks result-
ing from a merger between two troubled banks were
injected with capital sufficient to bring their BIS CAR
up to 10 percent. The total support for recapitaliza-
tion and loss coverage up to December 1998
amounted to W6.3 trillion and W14.7 trillion, respec-
tively.
The Government used public bonds to finance the
projected fiscal support. KAMCO issued W32.5 tril-
lion worth of bonds to purchase NPLs amounting to
over W50 trillion. KDIC issued W31.5 trillion worth
of bonds for equity participation and for compensa-
tion of the differential between liabilities and assets.
All the issued public bonds were provided “in kind”
Table 6:  Schedule of Fiscal Support (W trillion)
aFor the second round of restructuring of special banks, a few financially sound banks, merchant banks, securities companies, and trust companies.
bNonperforming Loans are substandard or lower loans.
c Purchases from 30 commercial and specialized banks, 30 merchant banks, and 2 surety insurance companies.
dCapital injection into Seoul Bank and Korea First Bank.
e Includes both capital injection and loss coverage.
fDeposit payment for suspended merchant banks, mutual savings and finance companies, and credit unions.
Source: Financial Supervisory Commission.
I tem Nov 1997–Aug 1998 Sep 1998 Oct-Dec 1998a Total Remaining Fund
Book Value of Nonperforming Loansb 16.0 23.0 5.0 44.0 27.0
Fiscal Support:
Purchase of Nonperforming Loansb 8.6c 9.1 2.2 19.9 12.6
Capital Injection 1.5d 3.3 1.5 6.3 10.5e
Loss Coverage 6.6f 7.0 1.1 14.7
Total 16.7 19.4 4.8 40.9 23.1
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Reshaping the Institutional
Framework
Financial sector restructuring is crucial for economic
recovery. Swift and prudent reform requires an in-
stitutional framework to coordinate and monitor the
reform process. To this end, major financial reform
bills were passed to provide a legal basis for required
institutional reforms.
On 29 December 1997, the National Assembly
passed a package of 13 long-awaited financial re-
form bills designed to facilitate financial restructur-
ing, improve prudential regulation, and accelerate
capital market liberalization. The package included
bills to correct the financial market’s built-in ineffi-
ciency by (i) enhancing the independence of the cen-
tral bank, (ii) establishing a neutral consolidated FSC,
and (iii) liberalizing foreign ownership of Korean se-
curities. Measures (i) and (ii) implied a shift from a
financial policymaking structure monopolized by
MOFE to a decentralized one with a check-and-bal-
ance system. The passage of the package signaled
the end of Government-controlled financial resource
allocation and provided the legal basis for financial
reforms.
THE CENTRAL BANK
The new Bank of Korea Act substantially enhances
the independence of the central bank. The BOK
governor, previously appointed by MOFE, is now
appointed by the President upon the recommenda-
tion of the State Council. Moreover, the governor,
instead of the minister of finance and economy, now
chairs the Monetary Board, which is the supreme
policymaking body of BOK. The previous objectives
of the central bank—maintaining the stability of cur-
rency value and the soundness of the banking and
credit system—are replaced by a new objective of
maintaining price stability. Consequently, the Mon-
etary Board is now expected to carry out more ad-
vanced central banking for the unified goal of price
stability. Responsibility for supervising the banking
industry has been transferred to FSC.
A CONSOLIDATED SUPERVISORY BODY:
THE FINANCIAL SUPERVISORY COMMISSION
AND THE FINANCIAL SUPERVISORY SERVICE
An informal and close relationship between financial
institutions and regulatory organizations developed
due to excessive Government influence. The Gov-
ernment has a significant regulatory role in its own
right and therefore has control over regulatory agen-
cies. It also often appoints the management of finan-
cial institutions from the ranks of former regulators.
This process, known as parachute appointment, has
hindered the development of a proper independent
regulatory system.15  Although parachute appointment
is less prevalent in the 1990s than it was in the 1980s,
it is still an issue of great concern, especially in the
nonbanking industry. Regardless of the eventual post-
crisis regulatory structure, this appointment method
should be stopped to enable regulators to do their job
independently.
Before the crisis, regulatory responsibility was di-
vided between BOK and MOFE, with BOK super-
vising commercial banks and MOFE supervising
NBFIs.16  Figure 1 shows the regulatory structure
before the crisis.
The dual nature of the regulatory structure and in-
adequate coordination resulted in inconsistent and in-
effective supervision. For example, the Office of Bank
Supervision (OBS), which was an internal organiza-
tion of BOK, supervised commercial banks. The trust
business of commercial banks, however, was under
Figure 1: Precrisis Regulatory Structure
BOK = Bank of Korea, ISB = Insurance Supervisory Board, MOFE = Ministry of
Finance and Economy, NBIC = Nonbank Insurance Corporation, OBS = Office of
Bank Supervision, SSB = Securities Supervisory Board.
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the supervision of MOFE, which also had the author-
ity to grant and revoke bank licenses. Lack of coordi-
nation led both BOK and MOFE to neglect corporate
governance of banks. Shareholders and depositors
were not subject to market discipline. Due to the lack
of corporate governance, the profitability of Korean
banks was quite low even before the crisis.17 Low
profitability certainly contributed to the banking crisis.
Merchant banks were regulated and supervised
solely by MOFE. Since MOFE had fewer than 10
officers to supervise 30 merchant banks, it delegated
supervision to the Nonbank Deposit Insurance Cor-
poration. This system of delegated supervision turned
out to be ineffective.
Sensitive to criticism since the early 1980s that
the financial supervisory system was inefficient and
corrupt, the Government established FSC in April
1998 under the Office of the Prime Minister to func-
tion as a neutral and independent agency. FSC took
over the supervisory power of MOFE, which the
ministry had de facto exercised through four legally
independent agencies. The four agencies—the Bank
Supervisory Board, Securities Supervisory Board, In-
surance Supervisory Board, and Nonbank Supervi-
sory Board—were merged in January 1999 into the
Financial Supervisory Service (FSS), which is under
the direct supervision of FSC. FSC also established
a subcommittee, the Securities and Futures Com-
mission (SFC), which is responsible for the orderly
functioning of the financial market. FSC plays a key
role in restructuring the financial and corporate sec-
tors. Under the new structure, BOK no longer has
supervisory power over the banking sector, although
it has limited bank inspection power. For example, it
may request FSS to inspect certain financial institu-
tions. It may also ask FSS to do so together with
BOK personnel, if necessary.
The reasons for consolidating supervisory pow-
ers are the following:
• Divesting MOFE of its supervisory power is a
necessary condition for the functioning of a neu-
tral and independent supervisory body.
• Rapid financial deregulation requires a consoli-
dated supervisory body. Check and balance
among MOFE, FSC, and BOK is expected to
help the industry become competitive and viable.
Consolidation, however, is not complete. MOFE
still holds legislative authority over any opening, clos-
ing, and merger of financial institutions. FSC’s su-
pervisory role should include authorization. A regu-
latory structure is required to preserve the integrity
of the financial structure and the soundness of the
real economy.
In planning its own organizational structure, FSC
studied (i) the entity-process model, (ii) the process-
entity model, and (iii) the objective-entity model.18
In the entity-process model, the primary organiza-
tion is based on the various entities in the financial
sector, such as insurance, banks, and securities, while
authorization or supervision plays a secondary role.
This model is useful for supervising a wide variety of
institutions, but its secondary emphasis on processes
makes it difficult to maintain consistency across in-
stitutions. Canada and Germany follow this model.
The process-entity model places primary empha-
sis on processes rather than entities. It also allows
effective supervision of a variety of entities and main-
tains consistency across institutions, but its second-
ary emphasis on entities makes it difficult to super-
vise the overall soundness of institutions, or to spe-
cialize in institutions. The UK follows this model.
Finally, the objective-entity model is organized
around objectives, such as customer protection, an
orderly financial market, and sound financial institu-
Figure 2: Postcrisis Regulatory Structure
FSC = Financial Supervisory Commission, FSS = Financial Supervisory Service,
SFC = Securities and Futures Commission
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tions. It has the advantage of maintaining consistency
based on objectives. However, it has the same draw-
backs as the process-entity model. Australia has
adopted this model.
FSC’s organizational structure was closest to the
entity-process model. After evaluating the three
models, FSC finally adopted the process-entity model.
A CONSOLIDATED DEPOSIT INSURANCE: KDIC
An important reform is the strengthening of deposit
insurance. KDIC, the consolidated deposit insurance
body, was established under MOFE in December
1997. Originally set up for commercial banks in 1996,
it was expanded to serve all the financial institutions
by absorbing five other separate insurance funds.19
It does not have supervisory power over the institu-
tions, although it has a limited joint inspection power
with FSS. Due to its short history, it does not have
enough reserves and it issues bonds to finance itself.
Its authorized bonds amount to W31.5 trillion, which
are used for capital injection and deposit-loss cover-
age of ailing financial institutions.
In November 1997, MOFE announced that the
Government would fully guarantee the principal and
interest of all deposits until end-2000 to prevent the
collapse of the banking system. The announcement
set off a serious moral-hazard problem: ailing banks
offered higher deposit rates to prevent liquidity short-
age, and depositors selected banks offering higher
deposit rates without evaluating the banks’ sound-
ness because all their deposits were fully protected
by the Government. The Government thus scaled
down the protection level to W20 million for deposits
made after 25 July 1998, which was a step toward a
market-driven restructuring of the financial system.
KOREA ASSET MANAGEMENT CORPORATION
KAMCO was established in 1962 to manage bad
loans of the State-run Korea Development Bank.
On 24 November 1997, it completed a major reorga-
nization effort to carry out the acquisition and dispo-
sition of NPLs more efficiently under the control of
MOFE. It adopted the divisional structure of the Reso-
lution Trust Corp. When it was reorganized, NPLs
amounted to W38 trillion and the Nonperforming
Asset Management Fund was W10 trillion. In May
1998, the fund size was increased to W32.5 trillion.
The bailout fund is used to buy NPLs of financial
institutions and assets of ailing business firms.
KAMCO finances itself by issuing W32.5 trillion
worth of its own bonds and by disposing purchased
assets through direct sale of these assets or of as-
set-backed securities. KAMCO bailout funds and
KDIC funds constitute the fiscal support needed to
facilitate the financial sector restructuring process.20
Deposit Insurance System
Major changes have been made in the Depositor In-
surance Law, such as reducing the amount of guaran-
teed principal to prevent moral hazard for depositors
and financial institutions. The revised deposit insur-
ance system now applies to almost all financial institu-
tions, including merchant banks, insurance companies,
securities companies, mutual funds, and credit unions.
Thus deposit insurance covers all financial institution
deposits except investment products, such as merit-
based trusts, benefit bonds, and trust accounts.
The new deposit insurance system divides depos-
its into three categories: (i) protected, (ii) temporarily
protected until 2000, and (iii) not protected (Table 7).
For example, only the principal is insured for accounts
of W20 million or more opened or deposited after 1
August 1998. Repurchase agreements (RPs) issued
by banks and securities houses after 25 July 1998,
and fidelity or surety insurance policies entered into
after 1 August 1998, are not insured. The Govern-
ment is studying the feasibility of a variable-rate in-
surance system based on risks of insured financial
institutions. It is expected that a variable insurance
premium rate will be applied once the study is done.
Prudential Regulations
Prudential supervision prevents financial institution
managers from exposing their institutions to shocks
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(ii) introduction of new banking sector disclosure
items, (iii) transparent accounting system with accu-
rate and conservative portfolio valuation and classi-
fication, (iv) enforcement of liquidity management
relative to foreign exchange risk, and (v) transparent
treatment of trust accounts.
PROMPT CORRECTIVE ACTION SYSTEM
In the US, the PCA system was designed to limit
regulatory forbearance by making intervention less
discretionary and more timely in order to reduce fail-
ure costs. Using the US system as a benchmark,
FSC introduced a PCA system for almost all finan-
cial institutions in June 1998. Under the system, the
Government will monitor quality control, on a quar-
terly basis, of financial institutions with a BIS CAR
of less than 4 percent. In evaluating assets and li-
abilities, FSC will decide whether or not to order these
institutions to submit management improvement
schemes.
Table 7: Deposit Protection
CD = certificate of deposit, RP = repurchase agreement.
a Merit-based bonds are trust products whose yields are based on performance.
Source: Korea Deposit Insurance Corporation.
Financial Institution
Banks
Merchant banks
Insurance companies
Securities companies
Mutual savings and
finance companies
Credit unions
Always Protected
Deposits, installment savings,
retirement funds, principal
protected trusts
Receipt notes, collateralized notes,
cash management accounts
Individual insurance contracts,
corporate insurance in the form of
retirement funds, retirement
insurance contracts
Deposits, futures, option deposits,
money market funds
Deposits, installment savings,
receipt notes
Deposits and investments
approved by credit unions
Temporarily Protected
Until 2000
Foreign deposits, negotiable
CDs, development trusts,
bonds issued by banks, RPs
issued before 24 July 1998
Corporate insurance besides
retirement funds, guaranteed
insurance contracted before
31 July 1998
RPs purchased after 24 July
1998
Not Protected
Merit-based bonds,a
RPs purchased after
25 July 1998
Noncollateralized
notes, RPs
Guaranteed
insurance contracted
after 1 August 1998
Accounts used for
tax-deferral purposes
that could jeopardize their solvency (Santomero 1997).
As part of their oversight functions, regulators get in-
formation through examinations. They often experi-
ence difficulty, however, in detecting misbehavior of
managers because of limited time and funds. It is there-
fore necessary to incorporate a disincentive system
into financial institutions that will prevent managers
from taking excessive risk. Capital adequacy require-
ments are examples of disincentives.21
FSC and MOFE have made significant efforts to
improve the institutional setup of the financial sys-
tem in order to prevent another crisis. Crisis preven-
tion demands a healthy domestic financial system,
the preconditions of which are (i) confidence of de-
positors, (ii) sound risk management, and (iii) pru-
dential regulation.
Since the crisis, the Government has established
a system of prudential regulation and supervision for
the financial sector. The new system includes the
following measures: (i) strengthened PCA system,
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The most important indicators in the PCA system
are the following: (i) BIS CAR for banks, (ii) opera-
tional net capital ratio for securities companies, and
(iii) solvency margin ratio for insurance companies.
Assessment of capital adequacy standards will be
facilitated by bringing up to international standards
(i) asset classification standards, (ii) provisioning re-
quirement standards, and (iii) accounting principles.
The PCA system is necessary to gain independence
from politicians. It is not yet clear, however, whether
FSC will apply the new standards strictly during the
crisis period, since strict application of the PCA sys-
tem might result in the closing of too many financial
institutions. Financial institutions’ difficulties are
mostly due to systemic causes rather than misman-
agement by individual institutions, and the PCA’s role
is limited.
BANKING SECTOR DISCLOSURE
Disclosure of reliable information enables market
participants to assess the condition and performance
of banks and allows market discipline to function.
Market discipline complements the work of regula-
tors, resulting in a stable financial system.
In April 1998, FSC added to the required disclo-
sure list new items necessary for judging manage-
ment conditions and which meet international ac-
counting standards, such as size of NPLs, risk man-
agement measures, and assets by country. In addi-
tion, the first half-year preliminary audit results have
become a mandatory disclosure item. Banks are also
required to disclose when large loans become
nonperforming and if they lose a lawsuit.
MARKET VALUE ACCOUNTING
Previously, securities (private placements and com-
mercial paper held by trust accounts) were treated
like loans, with no mark-to-market option. In June
1998, the Government introduced mark-to-market for
securities in order to make banks’ accounting sys-
tems transparent. Securities are now classified by
maturity rather than currency denomination. Thus
marketable securities must be valued quarterly at their
market rate.
This measure is a big step toward full market-value
accounting, represents a trend toward more market-
driven information, and is expected to force Korean
banks to respond more quickly to market conditions.
IMPROVEMENT IN CALCULATING BIS CAPITAL
ADEQUACY RATIO
In January 1999, the calculation of BIS CAR was
changed such that loss provisions for loans, except
for normal or precautionary, are deducted from Tier-
2 capital. In addition, some assets related to the prom-
ised yield liabilities in the trust account are treated as
assets in the bank account.
PRUDENTIAL RULES FOR FOREIGN EXCHANGE
LIQUIDITY AND EXPOSURE
In July 1998, the Government changed the regula-
tions to improve risk management for short-term for-
eign currency liabilities. Applying the risk manage-
ment technique to gaps between asset and liability
exposures, financial institutions are now required to
report maturity mismatches in the following catego-
ries: (i) 1-7 days, (ii) 7 days to 1 month, (iii) 1-3 months,
(iv) 3-6 months, (v) 6 months to 1 year, and (vi) over
1 year. Commercial banks started using this method
in their July 1998 reports. Another new regulation
stipulates that the ratio of current assets to current
liabilities (90 days to maturity) must be at least 70
percent. A new comprehensive risk management
system sets exposure limits for each country based
on international credit ratings.
TRUST ACCOUNTS
Rules providing for full disclosure to trust beneficia-
ries went into effect on 1 January 1999, precluding
any possibility of loss guarantees by managing banks.
All trust accounts with guarantees are placed on a
special balance sheet for supervisory and account-
ing purposes. For capital adequacy purposes, assets
in such accounts are weighted at 50 percent for all
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of 1999, and at 100 percent after 1 January 2000.
The new restrictions are applied to all trust accounts,
ensuring separation of the accounts for management
and accounting purposes.
Loan Classification Standards and
Provisioning Requirements
In July 1998, the Government made loan classifica-
tion standards and provisioning requirements more
conservative in line with international standards.
Loans in arrears for three months or more are now
classified as substandard or lower, and loans in ar-
rears for one to three months are classified as pre-
cautionary (Table 8).
FSS uses new loan classification procedures for
its semiannual auditing of bank loans. Its evaluation
incorporates the findings of diagnostic reviews and
ensures that classifications by management, as well
as reviews by examiners, fully reflect the debtor’s
capacity to repay, and not simply past performance.
On 1 July 1999, the loan classification system will be-
come even more conservative, with expected future
performance a criterion for classifying an asset as
problematic.
OBS, which was merged into FSS on 2 January
1999, also tightened provisioning requirements on 1
July 1998 to meet international standards. Require-
ments for precautionary loans have been raised from
1 to 2 percent. Provisioning requirements for sub-
standard loans, doubtful loans, and estimated losses
are now 20, 75, and 100 percent of each category’s
loans, respectively. For CPs, guaranteed bills, and
privately placed bonds belonging to trust accounts,
provisioning requirements are now in effect for the
first time. As for restructured loans, which have been
put in the precautionary or substandard category, FSS
will determine how they are to be classified.
Policy Issues
Prudential Regulations
Prudential regulations and supervision are the pri-
mary policy concerns, for which IMF and World Bank
have specified some issues. The issues and related
developments are as follows:
• FSC should be given operational independence
and adequate resources. These depend on many
factors, two of which are of utmost importance:
(i) authority to revise and write laws;22 and
(ii) organizational structure and staffing of FSS,
which was established on 2 January 1999.
• FSC needs to bring its regulations closer to
international best practice as expressed in the
Basle Committee’s Core Principles:
– Banks should deduct from Tier-2 capital all
provisions except those with respect to assets
classified as normal and precautionary in line
with Basle Principle 11, which prohibits includ-
ing provisions on loans that are substandard or
lower.23 With the effectivity of this measure
on 1 January 1999, Korean banks’ BIS CAR
was slightly lowered. Facing a lowered BIS
CAR, Korean banks are expected to decrease
loan assets, which are the most risky assets, in
order to increase BIS CAR. This will lead to a
more severe credit crunch induced by the
banks’ capital adequacy problems.24  Bank
lending contracted in the US when the regula-
tory agency there stiffened capital adequacy
requirements in the early 1990s.
Table 8: Changes in Loan Classification Standards
Source: Financial Supervisory Service.
Period of Overdue Payment Precrisis Classification Current Classification
1-3 months Normal Precautionary
3-6 months Precautionary Substandard or Doubtful
Longer than 6 months Substandard or Doubtful Substandard or Doubtful
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– On 1 January 1999, assets in trust account with
guarantee were weighted at 50 percent in cal-
culating risky assets, which again lowered BIS
CAR. Korean banks have two types of de-
posits: bank deposits and money in trust. There
are two types of money in trust: fixed-yield-
based (guaranteed) and performance-based
(not guaranteed). The fixed-yield-based money
in trust is de facto deposit, which is why the
Government guarantees it.
– Trust accounts should be separated from bank
accounts for management and accounting pur-
poses. In the past, the Chinese wall between
bank and trust accounts was so weak that man-
agement had the opportunity to misbehave.
The Chinese wall as well as disclosure will be
strengthened through a measure to be intro-
duced on 1 January 2000, pertaining to sepa-
ration of accounts in terms of accounting and
management.
– Forward-looking criteria (FLC) of loan classi-
fication will be applied beginning 1 July 1999.25
Once this so-called international standard is
followed, total bad loans of banks will increase
sharply and banks will need bigger loan-loss
provisions. For example, as of end-1998,
banks’ total bad loans and precautionary loans
were W33 trillion and W63 trillion, respectively.
With strict application of FLC, however, at least
50-70 percent of precautionary loans are
expected to deteriorate into bad loans. In this
case, total bad loans are estimated to range
from W64 trillion to W77 trillion.
• To ensure that prudential rules and requirements
for foreign exchange liquidity and exposure are
met, banks should maintain internal liquidity
control systems based on a maturity ladder
approach.26
• The same set of prudential regulations govern-
ing commercial banks should also apply to spe-
cialized and development banks beginning in 1999.
FSC examined the Korea Development Bank,
Export-Import Bank of Korea, and Industrial
Bank of Korea on 31 March 1999. It should
recommend remedial actions.
• The limit of 25 percent of equity capital for
lending to large shareholders and their affiliates
applies to merchant and commercial banks. All
connected lending was audited and disclosed
beginning in 1999.
• On large exposures, MOFE submitted an
amendment of the general banking law to rede-
fine single-borrower and group exposure limits.
Beginning January 2000, these limits will be re-
duced from 45 to 25 percent of total capital, re-
spectively.
• FSC needs to monitor cross-guarantees, which
should be completely eliminated by the end of
March 2000. The top five chaebol (conglo-
merates) were required to eliminate all inter-
subindustry group cross-guarantees by end-1998.
• With the unification of supervisory organizations
in April 1998, FSC needs to enhance consoli-
dated supervision to encompass the full range of
banking risk, including foreign exchange risk,
whether carried on in the principal bank or in its
foreign branches and domestic affiliates and
subsidiaries. FSC has to be internally integrated
to provide strong prudential supervision.
• Regulatory bodies should improve banking
disclosure, auditing, and accounting standards to
fully comply with the minimum requirements of
the International Accounting Standard. FSS
should make banks’ reporting requirements more
stringent so that supervisors will be better
forewarned of potential problems.
Resolution of Nonperforming Loans
Two policy issues are related to the resolution of
NPLs: (i) how to finance them and (ii) how to re-
cover the loss. The amount of financing depends on
the size and quality of NPLs, while recovery relates
to the management of NPLs. Both largely depend
on the state of the economy itself.
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The size of NPLs is a moving target. It changes
according to the standards of loan classification
used. Under stricter standards, NPLs are bigger.
The international standard became effective on 1
July 1999. As of the end of June 1998, FSC esti-
mated that NPLs, including precautionary and in-
ternationally substandard loans, amounted to W197
trillion, of which precautionary credit was W79 tril-
lion, and credit that was substandard and lower was
W118 trillion.
Assuming that NPLs amount to around W200 tril-
lion, by international standards, W32.5 trillion of pub-
lic funds are insufficient to buy all the NPLs of fi-
nancial institutions. If the purchase price of loans
that are substandard and lower is around 40 percent
of their face value, then W47 trillion, or W14.5 tril-
lion more than allotted, is necessary to buy them.
The Government should either increase the funds or
use the allotted funds in a different way.
KAMCO remains the sole asset management
company in the country. It has been criticized as in-
effective in bad-asset management.27  Two banks are
attempting to establish their own “bad banks” because
they believe they can manage bad assets more
effectively than other institutions, including KAMCO.
From end-June to end-September 1998, 22 commer-
cial banks resolved only W445 billion of NPLs. NPLs
that KAMCO did not purchase are estimated to
amount to W30 trillion.28  They need to be resolved
by individual banks. The issue is whether or not to
give tax and legal incentives to individual banks so
they can establish their own bad banks and resolve
NPLs by themselves.
Deposit Insurance System
Deposit insurance was introduced to lower exit bar-
riers. Originally, it covered deposits of depository in-
stitutions up to W20 million of principal. However,
to restore depositors’ confidence after the IMF pro-
gram was implemented, the Government provided
an unlimited blanket guarantee on pseudo-deposits
and deposits. Some ailing financial institutions took
advantage of the blanket coverage by offering high-
interest deposits.
A wide range of financial products of all institu-
tions are covered by deposit insurance. It was inevi-
table that the Government would adopt a wide safety
net since it needed to prevent massive bank runs and
financial turmoil in the wake of the financial crisis.
Considering that only deposits or similar financial
products of deposit institutions are covered in devel-
oped countries such as Canada, Japan, and US, the
coverage in Korea is too wide.
To lessen moral hazard of troubled financial in-
stitutions, the Government modified the coverage
of deposit insurance from full to limited. However,
this remedy only partially cures the moral-hazard
problem. The Government needs to introduce a risk-
based insurance premium system to deter high-risk
taking by ailing financial institutions. In other words,
a variable-rate premium reflecting risks of insured
banks should replace the fixed-rate premium. The
technical issue is how to determine risks of indi-
vidual banks.
It is obvious that wide coverage by deposit insur-
ance may have a negative effect on the economy.
For example, the autonomy of financial institutions
may be undermined since the Government has to
intervene in the internal management of banks to
decrease the risk of bankruptcy. The wider the range
of insurance coverage, the bigger the potential bur-
den of the Government.
Enhancing Competition
The policy issues in the area of enhancing competi-
tion are (i) how to lower barriers of entry and exit
and (ii) how to set up uniform regulations for different
types of financial institutions.
To reduce entry barriers, the Government permit-
ted foreign financial institutions to buy local banks.
There is no limit on foreigners’ equity holdings. Ko-
rea First Bank and Seoul Bank will be sold to foreign
financial institutions. To decrease exit barriers, the
Government introduced the deposit insurance sys-
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tem. To make regulations uniform, it organized FSS
to absorb other agencies.
As of end-1999, the Government successfully
completed its negotiations with a US financial con-
sortium (Newbridge Capital) to sell its shares in Ko-
rea First Bank, which was nationalized on 31 Janu-
ary 1998. However, the Government and the Brit-
ish-owned Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank termi-
nated their negotiations on the sale of Government
shares in Seoul Bank at end-August 1999. The Gov-
ernment will seek to attract a management team
for the bank through open international recruitment.
With the sale of Government shares, foreign banks
will increase their market share by about 8 per-
cent. In addition to foreign banks, several joint ven-
ture banks will emerge as major players, enhancing
competition.
The policy issues relating to entry barriers are
whether Government will permit (i) merchant banks
and mutual savings to become commercial banks and
(ii) domestic investors to become major sharehold-
ers of commercial banks. Exit barrier policy issues
are (i) how strictly FSS will apply PCA and (ii) what
kind of loss-sharing scheme will be used when there
are exiting institutions. Finally, the uniform regulation
issue is how well FSS will perform as a function-
based instead of institution-based organization.
Improving Financial Governance
The Government’s goal is to make the financial in-
dustry strategic in the 21st century. Profitability must
be enhanced. Unprofitable banks cannot be com-
petitive under any circumstance. Maximizing share-
holder value is a first step toward making banks prof-
itable. For shareholder value maximization to become
a priority for banks, ownership and corporate gover-
nance structures need to be modified to strengthen
shareholder rights. The policy issue is how to estab-
lish ownership and corporate governance structures
for banks to be profitable.
The ownership issue is a puzzle. Before the crisis,
banking laws stipulated that there could be no con-
trolling shareholders in Korean banks. In other words,
ownership of banks was limited. Since the crisis, the
banking law has been revised to allow foreign inves-
tors to acquire bank shares above 4 percent. Since
this law has been criticized for treating foreigners
more favorably than domestic investors, MOFE at-
tempted to revise it so as to treat Koreans and for-
eigners equally. The proposed amendment permits
domestic investors, including the chaebol, to have
controlling shares of commercial banks. The 4 per-
cent ownership restriction is meant to make it pos-
sible for any capable entity to own and manage a
bank. Some stakeholders worry, however, that the
chaebol will be the only beneficiaries of the new rules.
Faced with strong opposition, MOFE failed to sell
the idea and created a task force to produce yet an-
other proposal. The latest contains an additional con-
dition for chaebol to become controlling sharehold-
ers: they have to put more than 50 percent of their
equity capital in their controlling bank within two
years. The issue is how to lower the ownership bar-
rier while avoiding exploitation of the banks by their
owners.
Corporate governance in Korean banks had been
neglected until the banking crisis. One of the most
important issues is board governance, of which five
basic matters must be addressed: (i) board composi-
tion, (ii) role of directors, (iii) structure of the board,
(iv) board meetings, and (v) performance incentives
and evaluation. Boards of banks are composed mainly
of executive rather than nonexecutive directors. Ex-
ecutive directors should hold less than one third of
the board seats. Banking laws mandate that 70 per-
cent of nonexecutive directors should be appointed
by major non-chaebol shareholders and the rest ap-
pointed to represent the public interest. The law
should be revised so as not to restrict the composi-
tion of the board.
Nonexecutive directors should have both strate-
gic and monitoring functions. The board should be
management’s partner in shaping corporate strategy.
It must also monitor management’s performance
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against key strategic milestones. It should establish
long-term performance measures that focus on the
creation of shareholder value. Management should
report quarterly to the board on performance against
key indicators. FSC is trying to introduce US-style
board governance into Korean banks, such as Hanvit,
through templates. Nonexecutive directors, however,
are rare and they may not perform their expected
roles.
Bank Restructuring
Restructuring will consolidate the financial industry
by decreasing the number of banks and financial in-
stitutions. The financial industry will become a two-
tier system, with big leading institutions and small
following institutions as niche players.
According to FSC, three to five super banks will
emerge. These universal banks, with an international
scope across all product lines, will have two merits:
(i) scope of economy and (ii) one-stop service for
customers. Korean banks will move toward becom-
ing universal banks in order to compete effectively
against foreign universal banks. Legal impediments
to introducing universal banks are (i) the need for
permission from the holding company and (ii) regu-
lations on business scope. However, these legal bar-
riers will be eliminated in the near future. The banks
will be key in setting interest rates. Aside from the
major players, there will be numerous niche players,
specializing in either customers or products.
As the corporate banking market becomes de-
pressed, the consumer banking market will emerge
as the biggest market in the country. In the past,
manufacturers provided buyers with financing. Now,
however, manufacturers are forced to improve fi-
nancial soundness by decreasing their debt-equity
ratio. Hence, banks can move into the durable-goods
financing market, replacing manufacturers. Mortgage
banking will also become more active as banks seek
safer borrowers than corporations. The credit card
business will also be another big segment of con-
sumer banking.
As new, good-quality corporations withdraw from
the lending market, banks will be forced to develop
fee structures and to brush up on cash and risk man-
agement. Foreign banks are expected to hold their
competitiveness in the fee business market.
Low profitability in the banking industry makes it
difficult for Korean banks to recover from the bank-
ing crisis on their own. FSC makes Government as-
sistance conditional on profitability improvements.
Plans for profitability enhancement must be directed
toward the following benchmarks: (i) return on as-
sets—1 percent, (ii) return on equity (ROE)—15
percent, (iii) BIS CAR—10 percent, and (iv) effi-
ciency ratio—60 percent.
The profitability of banks depends on many things,
but the most important factors are (i) slope of the yield
curve, (ii) NPL ratios, and (iii) efficiency ratios. The
steeper the slope of the yield curve, the more profit-
able the bank. The difference between short-term and
long-term interest rates is decided by the central bank,
so it is not a control variable of the individual banks.
NPL and efficiency ratios, however, are control vari-
ables and individual banks should keep them below
certain levels in order to achieve decent ROE.
The banking sector has historically suffered from
(i) poor asset quality, (ii) regulated interest rates, (iii)
excessive competition for deposits, and (iv) poor as-
set-liability management, all resulting in low profit-
ability.29  Korean banks now face the “twin banking
problem”: worsening asset quality and undercapital-
ization. The domestic debt problem is characterized
by bankruptcies of large business corporations trig-
gered by overinvestment and highly leveraged finan-
cial operations. The consequence of overinvestment
was deteriorating loan portfolios. Large NPLs have
caused widespread fear of bank failures, which drives
depositors toward the better-quality banks. The
banks’ need to meet BIS CAR prevents them from
extending loans.
Before the financial crisis, there were 33 banks in
the country—16 nationwide, 10 regional, and 7 spe-
cialized. With 5 banks shut down and 3 mergers, a
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total of 25 banks remain—11 nationwide, 8 regional,
and 6 specialized. Through its support of recapitaliza-
tion efforts, the Government has become a controlling
shareholder of some of the remaining banks. Korea
First Bank and Seoul Bank have been Government
banks since 31 January 1998. After their merger, Hanil
Bank and Commercial Bank of Korea became de facto
Government banks, since the money for their recapi-
talization came out of public funds. Other banks have
also become de facto State banks as the Government
was involved in their recapitalization process.
State ownership of banks is worrisome because
Government officials seem not to be good bank man-
agers. If Government intervention in the manage-
ment of de facto State banks persists, the banks may
find it difficult to recover. At the same time, funds
will be channeled into the Government’s pet projects
regardless of their profitability, causing banking cri-
ses to recur.
The Government claims that so-called “hardware
restructuring,” which means closure or suspension
of nonviable financial institutions, was mostly done
by end-September 1998. It currently emphasizes
“software restructuring,” which means enhancing
managerial efficiency of financial institutions.
Reengineering and empowerment are the key words
replacing restructuring. However, restructuring is not
over yet: recapitalization and resolution of NPLs re-
main to be addressed.
Among the many banks which need Government
assistance in recapitalization are Hanvit Bank, Ko-
rea Exchange Bank, Korea First Bank, Seoul Bank,
and Chohung Bank. Around W2 trillion may be
needed by each bank to meet BIS CAR after 30
June 1999. The Government, however, decided not
to increase public funds for recapitalization, but in-
stead to use the retrieved funds.
Resolving the Credit Crunch
At the onset of the crisis in November 1997, the
Government’s first task was to overcome the for-
eign exchange crisis by securing the supply of for-
eign funds. It tried to obtain financial assistance from
international financial institutions and to extend the
maturity of eligible short-term bank debts. It also
adopted tight monetary and fiscal policies to squeeze
domestic absorption and to prevent capital flight.
Exchange and interest rates skyrocketed as a con-
sequence, further burdening indebted domestic firms.
As the Government started financial restructuring
and requiring the banking sector to raise BIS CAR,
most financial institutions halted new lending and even
collected existing loans. The severe credit crunch in
the financial and corporate sectors spilled over into
the real sector, especially the illiquid but viable small
and medium-size enterprises.30  Bankruptcies oc-
curred, and everyday about 10,000 people lost their
jobs. The five biggest chaebol, however, had no dif-
ficulty finding financing.
To ease the credit crunch plaguing the most vulner-
able small and medium-size enterprises, $1 billion from
the Asian Development Bank was injected into credit-
guaranteed institutions in January 1998. In April, small
and medium-size corporations received maturity ex-
tensions on their loans also to alleviate the credit crunch,
and $1 billion in World Bank funds to bolster raw-
material imports. The Government started to lower
interest rates by supplying more liquidity and speeded
up financial restructuring as it realized that the credit
crunch would not be resolved without sound banks.
These measures helped somewhat, although many
small and medium-size enterprises still have difficulty
raising funds without collateral.
Policy Recommendations
Prudential Regulations
There are three ways by which FSC may become
more independent:
• It may merge with the Department of Financial
Policy (DFP) in MOFE. The new body may be
called the Department of Finance. It would have
the authority to revise and write laws, and to
lead and monitor FSS.
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• DFP may be transferred to FSC.
• MOFE may transfer authority to FSC to revise
and write laws, without organizational reshuffling.
The third alternative is easiest because it does not
involve organizational change. However, DFP would
still need to be restructured heavily. FSS should re-
cruit professional regulators and examiners who are
capable of enforcing international best-practice regu-
lations. The unified supervisory organization needs
to enhance consolidated supervision through func-
tion-based organization.
To enforce prudential regulations, FSC should en-
act measures specified under the agreement with
IMF. The establishment of the international loan clas-
sification standard is delayed. Issues such as corpo-
rate governance of financial institutions and consumer
protection have yet to be addressed. In order to im-
prove corporate governance, banking laws must be
modified to strengthen the function of the board of
directors, which is expected to enhance the account-
ability of management.
Specific policy recommendations are the following:
• FSS should bring its regulations closer to inter-
national best practice as expressed in the Basle
Committee’s Core Principles. For example, it may
set up a special task force under the Department
of Supervision Policy in order to find out the
precise impact of these measures.31
• Trust business should be restructured in order to
protect customers. Chinese wall as well as dis-
closure should be strengthened before the 1 Janu-
ary 2000 deadline. Money in trust may be trans-
formed into mutual funds so that customers
clearly see the risks involved.
• The forward-looking standard of loan classifi-
cation should be applied immediately. It is already
much delayed; to avoid further delay, FSS should
take the necessary measures to recover BIS
CAR.
• FSS should recruit professional risk managers
as regulators and examiners to supervise for-
eign exchange liquidity.32  FSC must require banks
to implement asset liability management (ALM)
to reduce risks related to liquidity, interest rates,
and foreign currency. FSC needs to monitor
ALM monthly.
• MOFE and FSC should coordinate more closely
in applying the same set of prudential regula-
tions to specialized and development banks. Or
FSC should have full responsibility for special-
ized, development, and commercial banks.
• In addition to setting a limit of 25 percent of eq-
uity for large shareholders and their affiliates,
individual banks need to improve the credit ap-
proval process to avoid connected lending. For
example, independent loan officers must review
applications for large loans, and approve them
only when everybody agrees that they should be
approved. To ease concentration problems in the
loan portfolio, individual banks need to set inter-
nal guidelines. This is the starting point of credit
risk management.
• FSS should be made into a function-based orga-
nization as planned.
All the policy recommendations stress the need
for adequate staff and an understanding of the im-
pacts of policy measures. Neither can be obtained
without professional regulators and examiners
equipped with the proper know-how and skills. Mas-
sive outside recruiting is required.
Resolution of Nonperforming Loans
Different approaches are needed to deal with fu-
ture NPLs. In 1998, KAMCO had to purchase
NPLs because there were no other buyers. As the
economy weathered the foreign exchange crisis and
market conditions improved dramatically, commer-
cial banks have been able to resolve their NPLs by
themselves.
The face value of NPLs bought by KAMCO
ranges from W75 trillion to W85 trillion.33  However,
the peak level of NPLs is expected to be W118 tril-
lion even by FSC estimates. This means that NPLs
of W33 trillion to W43 trillion should be managed by
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individual banks. Other alternatives to resolve NPLs
may be considered, as follows:
• Permit the establishment of private asset
management companies and offer incentives.
• Encourage systemic debt-equity swap between
companies and banks.
The rationale for having private bad banks is that
bank managers cannot focus on their usual business
if they have to attend to large NPLs as well. Bad
assets may be managed through (i) a centralized
public asset management company, (ii) a decentral-
ized private asset management company, or (iii) a
combination of public and private asset management
companies. The third alternative seems inevitable.
Establishing private asset management companies
requires introducing a competitive bad-asset man-
agement system, which is more efficient than
KAMCO’s monopoly. The setting up of private bad
banks is possible only when there are investors who
are willing to put their money in a bad bank.34  Gov-
ernment needs to make the investment environment
attractive.
Deposit Insurance System
As the economy and financial markets recover, the
Government should see to it that the deposit insur-
ance system meets global standards and decreases
moral hazard by ensuring the following:
• Insurance should cover only bank deposits and
a limited range of NBFI deposits or deposit-like
financial products.
• Deposit insurance premiums should be changed
from fixed to variable as soon as possible.
Specific policy recommendations regarding the
deposit insurance system are as follows:
• Modify the premium to avoid moral hazard by
both banks and depositors.
• Enable the KDIC to pursue its goals.
• Limit insurance coverage to only a certain
amount of bank deposits after the year 2000 in
order to avoid moral hazard by depositors and to
encourage market discipline.
• Set up a single index of bank risk that both banks
and regulators agree upon. KDIC may introduce
a variable rate premium system based on riski-
ness of individual banks. However, FSS, in col-
laboration with the banks, needs to provide a
single risk measure which will serve as the
system’s base.
• Recruit professionals and examiners to staff
KDIC.
Enhancing Competition
Entry barriers to NBFIs have been significantly low-
ered. However, banks still have high entry barriers.
Government must permit merchant banks and mutual
savings to become commercial banks and domestic
investors to become major shareholders of commer-
cial banks. The danger that the owners will exploit the
banks can be eliminated if FSS supervises them, par-
ticularly in the area of connected lending.
Policy recommendations related to exit barriers
are the following:
• FSC must strictly apply PCA. In order to avoid
regulators’ forbearance, the criteria of PCA must
be transparent. The Government must shoulder
the resolution cost.
• FSS must become a function-based instead of
institution-based organization in order to achieve
uniform regulation. As lines of demarcation
among banking, insurance, and security
businesses become blurred, uniform regulation
will naturally follow.
Improving Financial Governance
Policy recommendations are as follows:
• The 4 percent ownership restriction should be
eliminated and safety nets prepared in order to
avoid exploitation of banks by their owners.
• Banks’ board governance should be enhanced.
The Government will be a main force in corporate
governance of de facto State banks as it will
influence nominations of chief executive offic-
ers (CEOs) and outside directors.
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• The number of internal directors should be less
than one third of the total number of board mem-
bers, who should not exceed 12. The board should
have committees on (i) board governance, (ii)
audit, (iii) management development and com-
pensation, and (iv) risk management.
– The board governance committee should be
responsible for all board processes, including
(i) nomination of directors, (ii) committee as-
signments, and (iii) director turnover.
– The audit committee should be responsible for
maintaining a sound system of internal con-
trols to safeguard shareholders’ investments
and banks’ assets.
– The management development and compen-
sation committee should lead the process of
evaluating top management.
– The risk management committee should over-
see risk management policies and processes.
• Board meetings should be held four to six times
a year, each meeting lasting an entire day, prop-
erly documented, and allowing plenty of discuss-
ion time. Management must ensure that all di-
rectors are properly briefed on issues arising at
board meetings.
• Director compensation packages should be
designed to align the interests of directors with
those of shareholders.
• Board evaluation should include annual assess-
ment of the functioning of board processes and
individual committees.
• All the processes related to board governance
should be clearly communicated to sharehold-
ers. The board and top managers should make
regular presentations to shareholders and give
them the opportunity to ask questions and vote
separately on important issues.
Bank Restructuring
The following policy measures are recommended:
• Acquiring banks, of which there are five, must
be permitted to establish their own bad banks in
order to deal with bad loans. Conditionally ap-
proved banks, of which there are seven, need
sizable recapitalization in 1999. Foreign investors
have suggested a good-bank/bad-bank split
alternative where Government takes equity
investment in a bad bank. The Government re-
jected this offer in 1998. However, it must re-
consider this alternative. In 1999, Chohung Bank,
Kangwon Bank, Chungbuk Bank, and Hyundai
Merchant Bank were merged. The merged bank
will be a de facto State bank as the Government
will support its recapitalization. The Government
must adopt measures similar to those applied to
Hanvit Bank. KEB Bank and Peace Bank are
expected to stand alone. After supporting recapi-
talization, the Government needs to enhance the
value of the banks by requiring strict adherence
to performance criteria.
• The Government should reprivatize State-
owned banks as soon as market conditions per-
mit. Meanwhile, it should hire management and
write management contracts with CEOs. CEOs
should be independent of Government, which
should limit its role to seeing to it that CEOs
keep the terms of the contract. CEOs may be
recruited from overseas. Highly qualified for-
eign management teams may introduce efficient
management and help regain the confidence of
foreign investors.
• To allay market fears, the Government should
clearly define the extent and duration of its role
in bank management. Although immediate
privatization would be best from a management
standpoint, it will be several years before the
banks are privatized. In the meantime, the
Government should make a blueprint for the man-
agement of State-owned banks. One possibility
is to appoint a CEO and managing directors
through an independent nomination committee
and write an explicit management contract. The
Government would merely monitor observance
of the contract.
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• The Government should fully assist recapital-
ization, otherwise the banks will probably revert
to their pre-recapitalized state, as did KFB,
Seoul Bank, and Hanvit Bank. It needs to give
top priority to allocating public funds for recapi-
talization.
Resolving the Credit Crunch
To resolve credit crunch in the financial market, credit
risk should be decreased. The Government must
adopt economy-boosting policies that will expand
money supply and encourage Government spending.
It should also complete financial restructuring and
help banks recover as soon as possible. At the same
time, banks must develop sophisticated techniques
to correctly analyze the credits of enterprises and to
determine how to supply loans in the most sound and
efficient way. For example, commercial banks may
set up a committee of professional investigative staff,
whose members all identify themselves. Banks may
also establish work-flow systems that devolve re-
sponsibility to lower staff members.
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Notes
1Three banks—Dongwha, Dongnam, and Daedong—
were suspended under a purchase and assumption (P&A)
formula on 29 June 1998. Commercial Bank of Korea and
Hanil Bank were merged.
2Two banks—Kyongki and Chung Chong—were sus-
pended under a P&A formula on 29 June 1998.
3The most recent attempt was the establishment of the 31-
member Presidential Commission for Financial Reform in
January 1997. Its task was to prepare a set of comprehen-
sive financial reform measures. Most of its recommend-
ations were enacted into the 13 financial reform bills only
on 29 December 1997, after the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) letter of intent required it, which was too late
to prevent the financial crisis.
4The series of bankruptcies started in December 1996,
when Hanbo was unable to meet payments of the princi-
pal and interest on its loans, and was placed under court
receivership. Then, in March 1997, Sammi Steel also
sought court receivership, followed by the Jinro Group
in April, the Daenong group in May, the Kia group in
July, the New Core Group in November, and so on. Kia’s
bankruptcy in July created the greatest shock waves. By
end-1997, 72 corporations listed on the Korea Stock Ex-
change had failed. More high-profile bankruptcies fol-
lowed.
5Efficiency ratio is defined as ratio of noninterest expense
to net operating revenue.
6MOFE, press release on the 4th National Economic Coun-
cil Meeting (14 April 1998).
7
“Precautionary” and “Substandard” loan classifications
are based on new standards. Asset size was adjusted by
evaluating bond holdings at market value rather than book
value, and loans by subtracting the estimated loss (20
percent of Substandard + 75 percent of Doubtful + 100
percent of Estimated Loss) from the book value.
8The committee’s suggestion was approval of four,
conditional approval of two, and disapproval of six.
9According to FSC, an “approval” rating leads to submis-
sion of detailed quarterly implementation plans, which will
be monitored on an ongoing basis. “Conditional approval”
requires submission of implementation plans within one
month. In the event of disapproval of an implementation
plan, a mandatory merger order or transfer of business
order will be imposed. “Disapproval” leads to mandatory
merger or transfer of business under a P&A arrangement.
Conditionally approved or disapproved banks that
voluntarily pursue mergers with sound banks are exempt
from mandatory exit.
10To ensure the soundness of acquiring banks, only high-
grade assets of the liquidated banks were transferred.
Nonperforming assets classified as “substandard” or lower
were excluded. Additional safeguard measures were taken
to prevent inherent risks involved in P&As:
• KDIC covered for any shortfalls in net worth of transferred
assets and liabilities.
• KAMCO and KDIC supported the disposal of NPLs by
the acquiring banks, and their recapitalization.
• Within a set period after P&A transactions, the acquiring
banks could exercise a put-back option by requesting
KAMCO to purchase acquired assets if these were later
found to be nonperforming.
11Examples of rehabilitation efforts include cost reduction
such as layoffs, branch network downsizing, and recap-
italization through major shareholder or foreign investment.
Loss sharing includes writing down existing equity and
forcing management to take responsibility for their
misdeeds. In the process, the depositors suffer little loss.
12At an exchange rate of W1,350/$, 1997 GDP is $311.8
billion.
13Ratios of restructuring cost to GDP are 8.3 percent for
Finland (1991-1993), 6 percent for the US (1991-1995), 4.7
percent for Sweden (1991-1993), and 4.3 percent for Japan
(estimated after 1998).
14In early September 1998, KAMCO sold to Goldman Sachs
approximately W255 billion (in book-value terms) worth
of acquired NPLs, most of which were uncollateralized.
The sale was made in the form of asset-backed securities.
15In Japan, parachute appointment is called amakudari.
Horiuchi (1997) argues that the amakudari system is not
effective in disciplining bank management.
16MOFE supervised special banks and commercial banks’
trust business in addition to NBFIs.
17From 1987 to 1995, the average return on equity (ROE)
of Korean commercial banks was 5.86 percent, half that of
US banks.
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18The process includes authorization, supervision, en-
forcement, and consumer protection. Authorization refers
to authority on entry and exit. Supervision is about policy
setting and examination. Enforcement deals with penalty.
19As consolidated, the fund is composed of bank accounts,
securities company accounts, insurance company accounts
(divided into life and nonlife insurance), merchant bank
accounts, mutual savings and finance company accounts,
and credit union accounts.
20On 26 November 1998, KAMCO started operation by
purchasing the combined NPLs of Korea First Bank and
Seoul Bank amounting to W4.39 million at the discounted
price of W2.91 trillion. The average discount rate was set
at 66.3 percent.
21Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act
linked supervision to bank capital. Regulatory forbearance
was reduced by requiring regulators to take prompt correct-
ive action when capital falls.
22Unlike the central bank’s independence, FSC’s operational
independence is based on the agency’s authority over
financial institutions from their birth to their death.
23Principle 11 reads: “The aggregate amount of specific
and general allowances should be adequate to absorb
estimated credit losses associated with the loan portfolio.”
24FSC has reinforced provisioning requirements and loan
classification, which resulted in slow or negative growth
of bank lending.
25A forward-looking standard considers capacity to repay
in addition to past performance.
26From sight to one-month maturity bracket, any negative
mismatch should not exceed 10 percent of total foreign
currency assets.
27Some people worry that KAMCO may try to become a
permanent institution.
28KAMCO does not purchase (i) small NPLs below W10
million, (ii) NPLs originated by overseas branches, or
(iii) NPLs without legal recourse. These are estimated to
make up 15 percent of total NPLs.
29From 1987 to 1995, the average ROE of Korean commer-
cial banks was 5.86 percent, or half that of US banks.
30Credit crunch appeared in the form of both high interest
rates and shrinking supply of credit because of faulty
financial intermediation.
31It is not clear whether FSS already knows by how
much BIS CAR will decrease due to deduction of provi-
sions on loans that are substandard or below from Tier-
2 capital.
32FSS has already advertised job openings in risk man-
agement. However, it should know that the best talents
cannot be recruited without proper compensation.
33NPLs here include only loans that are substandard and
below. Precautionary loans are not included.
34Unfortunately, not many banks can attract investors to
finance bad banks without Government assistance. This
means that even though the Government permits private
bad banks, there will be only a couple of them in the
beginning.
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